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Abstract. 
The Council of the EU is a crucial actor in EU legislative decision-making. However, how its reaches 
decisions is subject to considerable debate. Constructivists argue that the dominant mode is norm-
guided behaviour and deliberation, pointing to the informal ‘culture of consensus’. Scholars working in 
a rational choice tradition assume that member states strive to move outcomes as close as possible to 
their ideal positions, either by using their power in bargaining or by arranging beneficial exchanges of 
votes. Several bargaining and exchange models have been advanced by this literature. Finally, studies 
report that actors in the Council engage in problem-solving. In this paper, I explore the logics 
underlying these different conceptualizations of legislative negotiations in the Council of the EU. 
Furthermore, the paper discusses the interpretation of the existing empirical results and tasks for future 
research.    1 
1. Introduction 
The Council of the European Union is a crucial actor in EU decision-making. As it can be characterized 
as an international negotiation forum on the one hand and a supranational network on the other it is also 
a fascinating setting to study decision-making behavior. Drawing upon the general literature on 
decision-making and negotiation theory (Hopmann 1995; March and Olsen 1989; Scharpf 1997), 
several studies have addressed the question of how decisions are being made in the Council (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006: Ch. 11). We can distinguish between bargaining, exchange, problem-
solving, norm-guided behaviour, and deliberation. The first two have been grounded in rational choice 
theory, the latter two in constructivist approaches. Problem-solving can be fitted into both theoretical 
frameworks.  
 
Rational choice theories assume that political actors are goal-driven (utility-maximizing) and have 
consistent (transitive) preferences. Actors make choices based on their preferences over outcomes. 
When outcomes are determined not just by their own behavior they take this strategic interaction into 
account. In other words, they follow a ‘logic of consequences’. The preferences of actors are typically 
treated as exogenous and fixed. Constructivist theories posit that the behavior of actors is shaped by 
their identities and social norms. Thus, they follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 
1989) or a ‘logic of arguing’ (Risse 2000). Identities, interests and norms are socially constructed and 
thus subject to change. Both are institutionalist theories insofar they study how institutions (rules, 
norms, patterns of expectations) enable and constrain the behavior of actors. If treated as analytical 
tools or methodological approaches rather than ontologies, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Both rational choice and constructivism are ‘thin theories’ which only yield concrete expectations if 
substantive assumptions are made. If the welfare of others is postulated as part of the utility function, 
then rational choice will predict altruism. If hedonism is assumed to be the prevalent norm, then 
constructivism will predict egoistic behavior. Rather then being competing theories, they to some   2 
degree simply have a different focus, not least in terms of their time horizon. Actors might try to reach 
certain goals within the constraints of social norms and based on preferences which are constituted in a 
process of identity formation. In ‘thick theories’ of international relations and EU scholarship, 
rationalist explanations typically assume that the choices of governmental actor are informed by the 
national interest, whereas constructivist research focuses on ‘other-regarding’ norms(Fearon and Wendt 
2002; Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel 2003).  
 
In the next section I will explore the various models and modes of decision-making. Subsequently, I 
will discuss how to interpret the results in the existing empirical literature in light of these different 
models. Section four lays out tasks for future research. Finally, I conclude with some general remarks 
on the debate between rational choice and constructivist approaches in the study of the European 
Union.  
 
2. Modes and Models of Decision-Making  
Several typologies have been put forward to capture the range of decision-making modes. Most 
prominently, March and Olsen (1989) distinguished between the (rational choice) ‘logic of 
consequences’ and the (constructivist) ‘logic of appropriateness’. Thomas Risse (2000) has added the 
‘logic of arguing’, pointing out that the ‘logic of appropriateness’ only refers to norm compliance but 
not to the process of arguing about the applicable norm or its precise prescriptions in a given situation. 
Thus, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ did not cover the whole spectrum of decision-making modes 
envisaged by constructivist approaches. Similarly, we can distinguish between bargaining and 
exchange models within a ‘logic of consequences’. Several bargaining and exchange models have been 
used to explain decision-making in the European Union (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994; 
Thomson et al. 2006). All of these distinctions are primarily concerned with the outcome in distributive 
terms. However, negotiations also entail an integrative component focused on extending the bargaining   3 
space which can be described as problem-solving (Hopmann 1995). Both rational and norm-guided 
actors can be hypothesized to engage in problem-solving in some situations. Some authors have 
combined some of these modes (e.g., ‘deliberative problem-solving', Joerges and Neyer 1997). They 
are however analytically distinct and point to different causal mechanisms as the following discussion 
will make clear. Thus, I will distinguish between bargaining, exchange, problem-solving, norm-guided 
behaviour, and deliberation (Table 1). 
 
Bargaining 
In a bargaining perspective, decision-making is characterized by the interaction of actors who have a 
common interest in reaching an agreement (creating value) but strive to maximize their individual gains 
(claiming value). Bargaining is typically modeled as a series of proposals (Osborne 2004: Ch. 16). An 
actor only accepts an offer if it makes him better off than the best alternative to the agreement (e.g., 
unilateral action or the status quo). Thus, bargaining under unanimity leads to the lowest-common-
denominator. The distributive consequences of agreements are affected by the relative power of the 
bargaining partners (Odell 2000: Ch. 2; Scharpf 1997: Ch. 6; Warntjen 2010). Actors derive power 
from situational and institutional factors (Muthoo 1999; Muthoo 2000; Schelling 1960). An actor who 
is less eager to reach agreement is more powerful because he has to make fewer (or no) concessions. 
Situational factors determine how eager an actor is to strike a deal. The ability to hold out for a better 
offer could be due to the relative level of satisfaction with the current situation, attractive alternatives, 
or a longer time horizon. Institutional factors include voting power and procedural privileges. For 
example, larger voting power should, ceteris paribus, give more influence to bigger member states 
when qualified majority voting applies (Bailer 2008; Felsenthal and Machover 1988). Furthermore, the 
member state holding the Council Presidency arguably benefits from its prerogative of making the first 
proposal (Tallberg 2003; Tallberg 2006; Warntjen 2008a; Warntjen 2008b). Member states can also 
employ bargaining tactics to strengthen their position and derive disproportionate benefits from a deal.   4 
For example, member states can misrepresent their preferences, or make threats and promises to gain 
concessions. Under some circumstances, member states can also limit the available outcomes in their 
favour by ‘tying their hands’, for example through a mandate from their national parliament (Bailer and 
Schneider 2006; Martin 2000; Schelling 1960).  
 
Exchange 
Exchange can refer to a direct trade of votes on a limited set of issues (specific reciprocity), a 
mechanism by which control over certain areas is exchanged (institutionalized reciprocity) or an 
informal rule which allows mutual concessions for mutual benefit in long-standing relationships 
(diffuse reciprocity).  
Bargaining models focus on the preferences of actors and their resources (in terms of bargaining 
power). Exchange models do not just consider the preferences of actors on particular issues but also the 
relative importance (salience) of these issues to the actor. Actors share control over the outcome of 
joint decisions, but they value some issues more than others. The joint control of outcomes is 
conceptualized by the notion of resources of control over an outcome (Coleman 1990). The resources 
(or capabilities) of an actor are usually conceptualized by reference to the voting power of a member 
state (Arregui, Stokman, and Thomson 2004; Thomson et al. 2006; van den Bos 1991). However, in 
principle other sources of influence on the final outcome could be incorporated as well. An actor may 
exchange his votes on one issue for someone else’s votes on another issue that is of more importance to 
him (Sebenius 1983; Stratmann 1997). Through this process of vote trading (or log-rolling) a decision 
on a number of issues can be reached even if there is not a sufficient majority for each individual 
solution. At the aggregate level, vote trading results in larger majorities than expected as actors are 
voting against their preferences on individual issues (Groseclose and Snyder 1996; Tollison and Willett 
1979). Rather than thinking about votes for or against a proposal, one can also think about an exchange 
of influence with regard to the exact location of an outcome. This is the basis of the compromise model   5 
(Achen 2006; van den Bos 1991). The compromise model predicts that the outcome on each individual 
issue will reflect the preferences of the actors weighted by their (voting) power and salience. Thus, 
actors would refrain from using their power in the case of issues in which they are not interested. And 
they would, according to the compromise model, grant actors more influence if they attach more 
importance to a given issue. 
In contrast to specific reciprocity in the form of vote trading or log-rolling, diffuse reciprocity does not 
entail an exchange that is clearly specified in terms of the actions and actors. Rather than making a 
concession to one negotiation partner in one area conditional on a specific equivalent concession in 
another area by the same partner, a concession is made in the expectation that there will be an 
equivalent action to one’s benefit by one of the negotiation partners sometime in the future (Keohane 
1986: 4). Diffuse reciprocity allows more mutually beneficial deals being struck than reliance on 
specific reciprocity alone because it is not constrained by the number of issues being considered at 
(more or less) the same time. Thus, it can be in the self-interests of states to engage in diffuse 
reciprocity although it implies making sacrifices in the short run because it is beneficial to all of them 
individually in the long run (Keohane 1982: 342-3; Keohane 1986: 21-2). Because of the risk of states 
making concessions which are not being ‘re-paid’ later due to the lack of hierarchy in world politics, 
diffuse reciprocity is difficult to achieve. It would only occur ‘within cooperative international regimes 
with extensive shared interests’ like the European Union (Keohane 1986: 23; see also Achen 2006: 
101-3).  
Finally, institutionalized reciprocity refers to situations in which a mechanism is in place that ensures 
that one side has more influence in one area in exchange for having less in another one. For example, 
this could explain the procedural privileges of legislative committees (Marshall and Weingast 1988). 
Jonas Tallberg (2003: 16) has made a similar argument with regard to the Council Presidency: member 
states grant disproportionate influence to the member state holding the Presidency during their term in 
office as they will benefit from this once they are at the helm (but see Warntjen 2008b: 206).   6 
 
 
Norm-guided Behaviour 
Through a process of socialization actors internalize norms which are part of their identity and 
prescribe appropriate behaviour for certain types of situation. Although norms are socially constructed, 
most actors most of the time encounter them as something externally given. Rather than highlighting 
choice as the basis of individual action, norm-guided behaviour points to compliance with social 
expectations that are taken for granted (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Wendt 1999). Socialization in 
repeated interaction changes how actors perceive of themselves and subsequently they adopt their 
behavior to their modified identity. Is has often been argued that civil servants in Brussels ‘go native’ 
as they interact to find solutions acceptable to all (e.g., Joerges and Neyer 1997: 620). Thus, rather than 
pushing for the national positions actors in the Council would try to reconcile different positions to 
accommodate a common European interest after they have shifted towards a European identity. On a 
theoretical level we can distinguish between a socialization which affects the identity and subsequently 
interests of actors and socialization to compliance with certain norms of behavior. Thus, actors might 
become socialized to defend the common European interest vis-à-vis ‘narrow’ national interests or to 
accommodate heterogeneous interests in process of consensus-building. A more nuanced theoretical 
position than the ‘going native’ hypothesis postulates multiple layers of identities, which might create 
conflicting demands on an actor’s behavior. National delegates might feel obliged towards both their 
colleagues at home and at Brussels (Beyers 2005). Separate norms would be relevant for the member 
state holding the Council Presidency (Niemann and Mak 2008). 
 
Deliberation 
Whereas norm-guided behaviour leads actors to follow norms without making a conscious choice, 
deliberation establishes through discourse what ‘the right thing to do’ would be. Actors engaging in   7 
deliberation share a common set of norms but argue about which norms are applicable or what they 
prescribe for a given situation (Risse 2000: 7). They try to reach a ‘reasoned consensus’ (Risse 2000: 9) 
on what should be done. The power of political clout or bargaining advantages is replaced by the power 
of the better argument in this mode of decision-making. To participate in a ‘constructive discourse’ 
(Neyer 2003: 693) actors have to be open to persuasion and restrict themselves to only advance 
arguments which are consistent and not (obviously) self-serving. Thus, speakers not just merely 
disguise self-interested comments or threats but change their arguments. To be persuasive, arguments 
cannot be perfectly aligned with one’s (perceived) self-interest (imperfection constraint). Furthermore, 
once made an actor cannot deviate from an impartial argument (consistency constrain) without losing 
credibility (Elster 1998: 102-4). Drawing upon work in social psychology, Checkel (2003) argues that 
persuasion is more likely to occur with a novel member of the group who does not have deeply 
ingrained beliefs running against a new position. Furthermore, persuasion is more effective if 
arguments are made in a genuine discursive manner by an authoritative member of the group. Finally, it 
is more likely in ‘less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings’ Checkel (2003: 213). There is 
a disagreement on the latter point as other authors stress the importance of a public setting for 
deliberative interaction (Elster 1998: 110).  
 
Problem-Solving 
A problem-solving mode of decision-making refers to a ‘search for better, mutually beneficial solutions 
to problems that satisfy the needs, identities, and interests of all parties.’ (Hopmann 1995: 542) The 
focus is not on the distributive consequences of a negotiation, but rather on the creation of value to be 
distributed (Scharpf 1997: 130-2). Problem-solving can refer to the political problem of finding 
agreements which are acceptable to all (e.g., Hopmann 1995: 30) or to the technical problem of finding 
the (in the view of the participants) optimal policy (Scharpf 1997: 130). Problem-solving is assumed to 
be more likely when interests and/or distributional consequences are uncertain or already settled, actors   8 
are engaged in a long-standing relationship and share an understanding of the problem (Scharpf 1997: 
252; Joerges and Neyer 1997: 619) A problem-solving mode can be explained by the self-interest of 
actors in expanding the gains from coordination/cooperation (Hopmann 1998: 88-91) or by reference to 
deliberative norms (Joerges and Neyer 1997: 620). 
 
A negotiation can be driven by different modes of decision-making (Hopmann 1998: 93-4). We can 
conceptualize this as a sequence of negotiation stages, characterized by different decision-making 
modes. For example, a pre-negotiation stage of problem-solving can be followed by strategic 
bargaining. After a decision has been reached there might be problem-solving or deliberation when 
discussing issues of implementation in a post-negotiation stage. Alternatively, different modes might be 
at work depending on the context (Lewis 2008a).  ‘[A]rguing gives expression to the belief of an actor 
that he or she can advance his or her interest sufficiently well by justifying, explaining and persuading 
so as to be able to abstain from the use of threats or promises.’ (Neyer 2003: 693) For example, 
different modes might be at work in different institutional settings. In the context of the Council of the 
European Union, civil servants meeting in working groups or the group of permanent representatives 
(COREPER) might engage in problem-solving or deliberation whereas ministers might be bargaining. 
With regard to the foundation of these different models of decision-making, we might observe their 
logics working at different levels. If deliberative problem-solving leads to more efficient and effective 
negotiations (Neyer 2004), then it would be rational to adopt this decision-making mode. Behavior that 
seems irrational at some level might be quite rational overall (nested games, Tsebelis 1990). Similarly, 
a rational actor would (at least superficially) adopt a deliberative mode if he would expect an advantage 
in negotiations from doing so. ‘Members internalize the group-community standards because it is a 
source of social influence in a process of deliberation – to get what you want you have to play by the 
rules of the club.’ (Lewis 2008b: 178) The interpretation of behavior as following a ‘logic of   9 
consequences’ or a ‘logic of appropriateness’/‘logic of arguing’ thus would change according to the 
level of the analysis. 
 
3. Interpreting the evidence 
Despite increased transparency, studies of the Council are still impaired by a lack of data. First 
empirical studies de facto put forward probability probes when arguing that a particular mode was 
relevant for decision-making in the Council. More recently, the literature has developed towards more 
systematic studies including alternative hypotheses. In the following, I discuss the evidence put 
forward in studies of the decision-making mode in the Council and its interpretation (see also Elgström 
and Jönsson 2000; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: Ch. 11; Lewis 2003; Lewis 2008b).  
 
Socialization 
Socialization can be identified indirectly by its effect on actors’ behavior or (more) directly through a 
process of norm internalization. Socialization into a norm of consensus-seeking should lead to a 
prominence of problem-solving or deliberative decision styles. If actors are being socialized there 
should be a relationship between the strength of the (compliance to) a norm and the intensity of 
interaction. Furthermore, actors should adopt norms gradually.  
Socialization could be observed as new-comers start adopting their behavior to the group’s norms. For 
example, Sweden voted very often against proposals in the Council in its first year of membership 
although explicit ‘no’ votes are rare in the Council. This can be interpreted as a process of learning and 
internalizing the Council’s ‘culture of consensus’ (Lewis 2008: 176-8). Alternatively, it could 
potentially be explained by domestic factors. Furthermore, Sweden’s behavior at the beginning of its 
EU membership is the exception (Mattila and Lane 2001) although a socialization effect should be 
relevant for all newcomers (cf. Mattila 2008: 28). Indeed, the new member states after the 2004 
enlargement did change their behaviour in terms of contesting Council decisions. However, they started   10 
to contest more decisions rather than less as a socialization into a ‘culture of consensus’ would have it 
(Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 2007: 4).  
Interviews of Swedish civil servants who participate in Council negotiations point to the presence of 
both bargaining and problem-solving decision styles in the Council (Elgström and Jönsson 2000: 689). 
This indicates that there is no strong socialization into a norm of consensus-seeking norm but also 
refutes a characterization of Council negotiations as pure intergovernmental bargaining. A study of 
(Belgian) civil servants also points towards national representatives subscribing to views in line with a 
role as governmental delegates (‘intergovernmental role-playing’) and a European consensus-seeker 
(‘supranational role-playing’). However, there is no clear association between a stronger supranational 
orientation and more involvement or a higher level of contacts pointing to process of socialization 
(Beyer 2005). For COREPER, participants report a strong informal rule of ‘diffuse reciprocity’ (Lewis 
2000: 268). This can be interpreted either as an effect of European socialization or as diffuse an 
expression of a general mechanism of exchange in EU decision-making which is adopted by rational 
actors.  
 
Consensual decision-making 
Decision-making in the Council is characterized by the lack of formal votes and negative votes 
(Hagemann 2008; Hayes-Renshaw, Wallace, and van Aken 2006; Heisenberg 2005; Mattila 2008; 
Mattila and Lane 2001). The voting behavior of ministers in the Council cannot always be explained by 
their preferences on the issue(s) at hand (König and Junge 2008: 93). Case studies and (former) 
practitioners report that civil servants in the Council try to accommodate the interests of other member 
states (Bostock 2002; Elgström and Jönsson 2000; Lewis 2005). Consensual decision-making can be 
explained through a norm prescribing consensual/ deliberative behavior or as a consequence of a 
rational use of exchange mechanisms. Actors would vote against their (immediate) preferences if they 
engage in vote trading which would explain the absence of negative votes despite heterogeneous   11 
preferences (Mattila and Lane 2001). Oversized majorities and the search for consensus can also be 
explained by the repeated interaction of rational actors in a pattern of generalized exchange. ‘For purely 
instrumental reasons, it makes sense not to simply outvote isolated or minority positions when you 
could find yourself in the same position next week.’ (Lewis 2003: 108). Thus, consensual decision-
making does not pose problems for formal models as Heisenberg (2005: 79) is claiming. Indeed, she is 
referring to a formal model (vote trading) as a possible casual mechanism herself (Heisenberg 2005: 
70). Similarly, the existence of informal rules is not problematic for rational choice models. In fact 
there are rational choice models explaining the existence of informal norms such as universalism or 
inclusiveness in legislative bargaining (Weingast 1979). The interpretation of the lack of negative votes 
also depends on assumptions with regard to the Commission’s proposal and the distribution of 
preferences in the Council. If the Commission anticipates the positions of member states and adapts its 
proposal accordingly, then member states would have no reason to vote against the proposal (König 
and Junge 2008). Similarly, we would expect oversized majorities if the member states have a vested 
interest in the policy coordination within the EU (Achen 2006).  
 
 
Arguing and justification of positions  
 
Models of deliberation would predict that actors argue over factual claims and the applicability of 
shared norms and hence would justify their positions. Indeed, this behavior has been reported as 
characterizing decision-making in the Council (Lewis 2000, 2003; Bostock 2002). A rational actor with 
a limited time horizon would only lay out his position in order to build a sufficient majority. If engaged 
in a long-standing relationship however, a rational actor might justify his position to increase his 
reputation (Kreps 1990) and/or to provide information relevant for future negotiations. Thus, the use of 
justifications does not necessarily depend on the applicable voting rule (cf. Lewis 2008: 174-6).  
 
   12 
4. Tasks for future research 
To reach definitive conclusions on the decision-making mode at work in the Council (or its various 
incarnations) at a certain point in time it will be necessary to spell out in more detail what the 
predictions of the various models are, include all modes in systematic empirical studies, draw upon 
several sources of data (triangulation), and increase the number of observable implications of the 
models by investigating both the process and outcome of decision-making. 
 
Studies identifying the decision-making mode in the Council face several obstacles. A decision-making 
mode cannot be observed directly. Studies utilizing interviews of participants have to be aware that 
statements might be misleading artifacts of the interview situation and have to be carefully interpreted 
in light of the context to avoid drawing wrong conclusions (Berry 2002). Similarly, documents 
detailing strategic cost-benefit-calculations could suggest rational or rationalizing behavior. The 
absence of such documents would not prove the absence of rational behaviour (cf. Lewis 2008: 169). 
Using several sources of data (‘triangulation’) can partially remedy this situation. The various models 
of decision-making have to be further substantiated (‘thickened’) to derive testable hypothesis. For 
example, to study habitual norm compliance requires hypothesizing a specific norm. Norms can relate 
to identity and interest of the negotiation partners (e.g., national delegate), the conduct of negotiations 
(e.g., inclusiveness and equality), the goal of negotiations (e.g., sustainable policy) or properties of the 
negotiation outcomes (e.g., fairness). Several norms might be relevant potentially moving behaviour 
and outcomes in different directions. Finally, different modes might predict the same or very similar 
results (observational equivalence). The same evidence could be used in support of different models 
(Lewis 2008b: 168; Moravcsik 2001). For example, figure 1 depicts a situation in which member states 
have different views on a topic which can be represented in a unidimensional policy space (e.g., in 
terms of more-less regulation or more-less Europe). For simplicity’s sake, assume that there are seven 
member states with equal voting power that decide by simple majority and disregard the location of the   13 
status quo.  There are three groups of member states: a majority (2, 3, 4, and 5) has a relatively 
moderate position, two member states have more extremist views (6, 7), and one member state 
occupies an isolated position. However, member state 1 has a much stronger interest in the topic than 
all the other member states. In this example, the compromise model would predict that the outcome lies 
between the moderate group and member state 1. But this could also be interpreted as the outcome due 
to the ‘culture of consensus’. Rather than outvoting member state 1, the other member states take its 
position into account. However, the same could be said for an outcome where the moderate majority 
accommodates the interests of the more extremist member states to the right (e.g., an outcome between 
member states 5 and 6). Similarly, an outcome at the ideal point of member state 2 is already more 
accommodating to the views of member state 1 than an outcome in the middle of the moderate group. 
To test whether decision outcomes in the Council are due to compliance with a norm or in line with 
rationalist exchange models we need to specify which norm is relevant and what it would predict. 
Furthermore, a test might be inconclusive due to observational equivalence. To overcome the latter 
issue we could increase the number of observable implications (cf. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 
Ch. 6) by studying both the decision outcome and the process leading to it.  
 
 
 
   14 
4. Conclusion 
The general literature on decision-making and negotiation theory has put forward several models 
suggesting different modes of decision-making. Several studies have scrutinized decision-making at 
various levels in the Council (working groups, COREPER, ministerial meetings) using interviews, case 
studies and statistical data of roll-call votes. The debate can be grounded in the theoretical frameworks 
of rational choice and constructivism. We can distinguish between bargaining, exchange, problem-
solving, norm-guided behavior and deliberation. Case studies and interview data suggest that 
deliberative discourse and a problem-solving mode are strongly present at the meetings of civil 
servants, but also point to the occurrence of hard bargaining. The lack of formal and negative votes has 
been interpreted as compliance to a norm of consensus but it could also be a consequence of a 
widespread practice of exchange (diffuse reciprocity). Thus, the empirical literature is so far 
inconclusive. Indeed, several modes of decision-making can be in effect at various stages or in different 
settings of the decision-making procedure. In terms of the general debate between rational choice and 
constructivism, studies of EU decision-making might remain inconclusive because the interpretation 
depends on the perspective and level of the analysis. When an actor’s strategic behavior (e.g., pressing 
for his own position) is greeted with outrage and subsequent isolation, the analyst can point to the 
working of a norm (e.g., consensual decision-making) in a constructivist vein or the enforcement of 
informal rules through sanctions and the calculated risk of norm violation in a rational choice vein. 
Furthermore, behaviour that seems irrational (i.e., not based on specific cost-benefit calculations) at 
one level might be rational at another (e.g., taking a longer time horizon). To advance the study of 
decision-making modes in the Council we will need to be more specific with regard to the differences 
between the various modes by increasing the number of observable implications (e.g., studying both 
outcome and process) and developing more specific predictions (e.g., what does ‘consensus’ imply for 
decision outcomes?). Furthermore, on a theoretical level we need to develop theories on how the 
different modes might interact in various settings. Empirically, we need to move from plausibility   15 
probes to comprehensive tests of competing hypotheses and utilize a wider range of sources to cross-
validate findings.  
 Table 1: Modes of Decision-Making in the Council of the European Union 
  Bargaining  Exchange  Problem-solving  Norm-guided 
Behavior 
Deliberation 
Theoretical 
Framework 
Rational Choice  Rational Choice  Rational Choice or 
Constructivism 
Constructivism  Constructivism 
(Standard) Assumptions 
Actor 
motivation 
Utility maximization 
Exogenous preferences 
Utility maximization 
Exogenous preferences 
Utility maximization or 
norm compliance 
Norm compliance 
Endogenous preferences 
Norm compliance 
Endogenous preferences 
Setting  (Typically) one-shot game  Repeated interaction       
Mechanism(s)  ‘Power politics’ 
Threats/Promises 
Specific reciprocity  
(Issue-linkage/vote trading) 
 
Institutionalized exchange 
 
Diffuse reciprocity/ 
generalized exchange 
Search for alternatives 
that are better for all 
negotiation partners 
Socialization 
 
Arguing/Persuasion 
Predictions 
Process  ‘Power politics’ 
 
Threats/Promises 
 
Coalition building 
Search for issue-linkages 
and feasible package deals 
 
Taking relative salience of 
issues into account 
Search for alternatives 
that are mutually bene-
ficial beyond current 
proposals 
Internationalization of 
group norms 
 
Compliance with group 
norms 
Attempts of convincing 
other members 
 
References to shared 
norms 
Outcomes  (depends on utility functions) 
Reflects preferences  
distribution 
 
Lowest-common 
denominator  
 
Reflecting power of 
member states 
Reflecting preferences and 
salience 
 
Oversized majorities 
possible 
Extension of bargaining 
space 
Reflect shared norms and 
common understanding of 
situation 
 
 
Reflect shared norms and 
common understanding of 
situation   17   18 
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